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Where Did the Nez Perces 
by William L. Lang 
On October 5, 1877, at the end of one of the truly heroic 
episodes in the Indian Wars in the Northwest, Chief Joseph 
of the Nez Perces surrendered to General Nelson A. Miles on 
a snow-dusted battlefield along Snake Creek near present- 
day Havre, Montana. The Indians gave up just forty-some 
miles short of their destination-the international border 
with Canada, where they hoped to find a sanctuary. They had 
been pursued for nearly three months and over thirteen 
hundred miles from their reservation in central Idaho, testing 
the military's skill and their own stamina. In his surrender 
message, Joseph described his people's condition as destitute 
and his warriors as tired of the struggle. "I will fight no more 
forever"-purportedly Joseph's words-became an anthem 
and was symbolic of the Nez Perces' struggle and failure to . . 
escape the military's inevitable maw. : 
A few more days of either better weather or more strength 
might have changed the tragic outcome of this nearly legen- 
dary tale of heroics on the Montana plains. What had pre- 
vented the Nez Perces from outdistancing their pursuers? 
How had they been able to succeed for hundreds of miles and 
months of deprivation only to fall short during the first weeks 
of autumn? 
Part of the explanation is in Yellowstone National Park. It 
was in Yellowstone that the Nez Perces took their only rest 
during the long march. Having consistently outmaneuvered 
the military since their flight in central Idaho in July, the 
eight hundred or more Nez Perces had pushed themselves and 
their nearly two thousand head of stock as hard as they could. 
But in Yellowstone, with the military several days behind 
them, they paused for nearly two weeks, time enough to have 
outraced the harsh autumn weather and the military's pincer 
to gain sanctuary in Canada. 
Why did the Indians stay so long in the Park? And exactly 
where did they go? These two questions have puzzled journal- 
ists and historians ever since the surrender, and the answers 
that have been proposed have never been satisfactory. Too 
many contradictions remain unresolved and too many impor- 
tant issues have been ignored by historians, whose inatten- 
tion to details of the geography and ignorance of the 
landforms have sent them literally on the wrong trails. Their 
misreading of the documents and their mistaken assumptions 
about Indian leadership have led them even further astray. 
Most importantly, they have misunderstood the Indians' 
purpose. The clues have been there all along, both in the 
documents and on the ground in Yellowstone National Park.z 
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R etracing the physical route of the Nez 
Perces and the documentary trail left by 
military, civilian, and Indian sources is part 
detective work and part primer on the importance 
of details in reconstructing historic events. The 
sources are meager: military reports and official his- 
tories; contemporary news stories and articles; 
popular accounts; a few diaries, letters, and mem- 
oirs of participants; and Indian oral histories. But 
the information is there, if only the right questions 
are asked. 
The right questions begin with the history of the 
events during the summer of 1877. Because of 
political, economic, and especially religious and 
cultural conflicts, bands of Nez Perces on their res- 
ervation in central Idaho (led principally by Joseph, 
Looking Glass, and White Bird) chose to flee for 
sanctuary rather than engage frontier military forces 
that had been sent to chastise them. Akey figure in 
the conflict, Chief Joseph, had unwillingly led his 
band from its homeland in northeastern Oregon to 
the reservation in Idaho just before the military 
began its disciplinary action. Heading east from the 
Clearwater River in July, with General O. O. Howard 
and the 7th Infantry in pursuit, the Nez Perces 
engaged in a flee-hide-and-retreat strategy to suc- 
cessfully outmaneuver the often slow moving mili- 
tary, following a difficult trail over Lolo Pass and 
down into Montana's Bitterroot Valley. 
In Montana, the Nez Perces made their second 
major decision, which committed them to travers- 
ing some of the roughest terrain in North America. 
After the Indians had skirted the barricades that 
Captain C. C. Rawn from Fort Missoula had thrown 
up at the bottom of Lolo Canyon-afterward known 
as "Fort Fizzle"-the chiefs argued about where 
they should go. Most wanted to avoid a fight, with at 
least one leader warning that it could only end in 
complete destruction. White Bird and Red Owl 
wanted to head north through the Flathead Indian 
1. Within two years, articles were published in national periodicals 
about the Nez Perce flight and ChiefJoseph. The first by a participant was 
The Wonders of Geyser Land: A Trip to the Yellowstone National Park of 
Wyoming (Black Earth, Wisconsin: Burnett & Son, 1878), written by Frank 
Carpenter, a tourist captured by the Nez Perces in Yellowstone. Carpenter's 
account created several myths about the Indians? motives and actions. 
One year later, Rt. Rev. W. H. Hare edited "Chief Joseph's Own Story," in 
North American Review (April 1879), which told the story purportedly in 
Joseph's own words. Thomas A. Sutherland, a journalist who accompa- 
nied the military during part of the pursuit, wrote Howard's Campaign 
Against the Nez Perce Indians (Portland: A. G. Walling, 1878) and contrib- 
uted significantly to the image of Joseph as a military genius. Ami Frank 
Mulford's FightingIndians in the 7th United States Calvary (Corning, New 
York: Paul L. Mulford, 1878) added to Joseph's military reputation. By 
1881, when O. O. Howard wrote Nez Perce Joseph: An Account of His 
Ancestors, His Lands, His Confederates, His Enemies, His Murders, His 
War, His Pursuit and Capture (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1881), Joseph's 
field generalship and sagacity were already established in the popular 
mind, although Howard believed Joseph and his band to be "savages" and 
"treacherous." See O. O. Howard, letter to editor, (Portland) Oregonian, 
May 3, 1879. For a corrective on Joseph as a military genius, see Mark 
H. Brown, "The Joseph Myth," Montana, the Magazine of Western History 
22 (Winter 1972): 2-17. 
Reservation directly to Canada and safety. But 
Looking Glass urged going south and east to the 
Yellowstone country and the Crows because, as 
Looking Glass reportedly argued, "the Crows had 
promised them that whenever the Nez Perces fought 
the whites they would join them."3 
This was one of several times during the flight 
when Nez Perce leaders hotly debated what tactics 
to employ and which route to take. Whites have 
consistently misinterpreted the content and pur- 
pose of these councils. To observers familiar with 
military decision making, the Indians' discussions 
have suggested confusion and disorganization of 
the worst kind, dominated by indecision and ineffi- 
ciency. Although we do not know many of the 
details, it is clear that the Nez Perce leaders chose 
their route as they went by solving problems through 
council discussions. In this case, Looking Glass 
evidently convinced his fellow chiefs that going to 
Crow country by way of the Bitterroot and Big Hole 
valleys was the safest route.4 
Their decision to camp in the Big Hole Valley in 
early August, however, turned out to be tragic. John 
Gibbon's troops from Fort Shaw and an undisci- 
plined company of volunteers surprised the Nez 
Perces in a pre-dawn raid. The whites inflicted heavy 
losses and destroyed most of the Nez Perces' house- 
hold goods. "It was a dreadful sight," Major Edwin 
Mason of the 7th Infantry wrote his wife after the 
battle, "dead men, women and children. More 
squaws were killed than men."5 The Nez Perces 
rallied to fight off the raiders and then reeled from 
the battle in anger and facing a dire situation. In pain 
and sorrow, they carried with them the remnants of 
their households and raced headlong east from the 
battlefield, trying to shake Howard and Gibbon. By 
2. The best historical accounts of the Nez Perce flight are Merrill D. 
Beal, "I Will Fight No More Forever," ChiefJoseph and the Nez Perce War 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963); Mark H. Brown, The 
Flight of the Nez Perce (New York: Putnam, 1967); Francis Haines, Red 
Eagles of the Northwest: The Story of ChiefJoseph and His People (Portland: 
Scholastic Press, 1939); Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Nez Perce Indians and 
the Opening of the Northwest (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 1965). The best histories from Indian sources are Lucullus V. 
McWhorter, Hear Me My Chiefs! Nez Perce History and Legend (Caldwell, 
Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1942); McWhorter, Yellow Wolf: His Own Story 
(Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1940); Allen P. Slickpoo, Nonn Nee-Me- 
Poo (We, the Nez Perces) Culture and History of the Nez Perces (Lapwai, 
Idaho: Nez Perce Tribe, 1973). 
3. A confidant of the Nez Perces, fur trader Duncan McDonald, got 
this information in conversations with Nez Perces in Canada after the 
flight and reported them in a series of letters published in New Northwest 
(Deer Lodge, Montana), January 10, January 17, February 7,1879. At this 
point of decision, and likely others, the Nez Perces had alternative plans. 
According to McDonald, White Bird had been prepared to charge Rawn's 
breastworks, torch the whole area, burn out ranchers, and race north 
to Canada. 
4. According to McDonald, there were discussions among the chiefs 
about going to Crow country and staying there over the spring and 
returning to Idaho the next spring. New Northwest, January 17, 1879. In 
Flight of the Nez Perce (202), Mark Brown described the Indians' decision 
to flee to Montana as likely the result of Indians "quarreling among 
themselves" and "their naive and simple analysis of their problem." 
5. Edwin Mason to Mrs. Mason,August 13,1877, Mason Letters, MC 
80, Montana Historical Society Archives, Helena [MHSA]. 
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mid-August and after another battle, the Nez Perces 
entered Yellowstone National Park, exhausted and 
edgy about whites but relieved that the military 
lagged a few days behind them. 
Once in the Park, the Nez Perces complicated 
their flight and put themselves in additional jeop- 
ardy. As they moved east up the Madison River, 
their advance guard encountered and captured two 
prospectors and nine Montana tourists near the 
Lower Geyser Basin along the Firehole River. Fear- 
ing that any one of them might alert the military to 
their location, the Nez Perces decided to keep the 
whites in their camp and under surveillance. They 
had little alternative, but their decision had signifi- 
cant consequences in the enfolding drama. Several 
tourists would escape from the camp and give valu- 
able information to the military about the Nez Perces' 
route, allowing Howard and his superiors to plan an 
encirclement of the Indians. The Nez Perces' cap- 
ture of the tourists also increased the pressure on 
Howard to catch the fleeing Indians. And in the 
Indians' camp, the presence of the tourists created 
friction between those who wanted to take venge- 
ance on them for the brutality of the Big Hole battle 
and those who wanted to avoid any more conflict.6 
During the next thirteen days, from August 24 to 
September 5, the Nez Perces slowed their march, 
while Howard caught up and other military units 
moved in from the north and east to intercept them. 
The Indians traveled slowly, taking hours to string 
into camp and hours more to move back on to the 
trail. Each family and larger band trailed their own 
horses, carried their own household goods, and 
camped together. The white prisoners, traveling 
behind the women's pack train, were under the con- 
trol of Lean Elk, a mixed-blood who spoke English. 
In reconstructing the events.from this point in the 
story, three things should be kept in mind: the Nez 
Perces traveled in separate bands with no individual 
in overall command; they were unsure of which 
route they wanted to take; and, although they had 
some knowledge of the military's positions, they 
had no idea of its strategy. 
he standard version of what the Nez 
Perces did in Yellowstone originated in an 
article published in James Mills's New North- 
west in mid-September 1877, while the Indians were 
still eluding the military's grasp in central Montana. 
Its source, John Shively, was one of the people the 
6. For descriptions of the conflict among the Nez Perce, see Mrs. 
George F. Cowan, "Reminiscences of Pioneer Life," Contributions tothe 
Historical Society of Montana, 10 vols. (Boston: J. S. Canner, 1966), 4:156- 
187; Carpenter, Wonders of Geyserland, 58-62; McWhorter, Yellow Wolf, 
170-173; Heister Dean Guie and Lucullus V. McWhorter, Adventures in 
Geyserland (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Press, 1935), 111-122. 
Chief Joseph, shown here in about 1877, was 
mistakenly taken to be the warrior chief who 
guided the Nez Perces on their 1,200-mile trek. 
Nez Perces had captured in the Park. Shively had 
been held by the Indians for eleven days before he 
managed to escape in early September and hike 
through the wilderness to the nearest Montana 
settlements, where he began telling his incredible 
story. Shively gave the New Northwest editor a de- 
tailed account of the Nez Perces, complete with 
descriptions of camp life, speed of travel, and pre- 
sumed conflicts among Indian leaders. As compel- 
ling today as it must have been in 1877, Shively's 
story emphasized danger and his backwoods savvy 
in making a thrilling dash for freedom. His descrip- 
7. New Northwest, September 14,1877. ForJames Mills's changing 
attitudes toward the Nez Perces, see Brown, Flight of the Nez Perce, 216- 
217, 248, and Rex C. Myers, "The Settlers and the Nez Perce," Montana, 
the Magazine of Western History 27 (Autumn 1977): 20-29. 
8. New Northwest, September 14,1877. Mills was equally critical of 
the military. Writing in an editorial in this same issue, he charged that 
Howard was off "geyser gazing," rather than pursuing the Nez Perces in 
Yellowstone and further that the whole campaign was the product of 
corrupt Indian agents and the infamous "Indian Ring." 
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William Henry Jackson took this photograph of 
Looking Glass when the Nez Perce chief was on 
an earlier trip to Crow Country in 1871. 
tion of the Indians' behavior in Yellowstone, how- 
ever, is the most important part of his testimony. 
Shively claimed that the Indians had become lost 
and had wandered aimlessly for several days. This 
version of events has been repeated in one form or 
another by historians ever since.7 
Shively portrayed the Nez Perces as disorgan- 
ized and confused. At one point, he reported, the 
leaders had become so disoriented that they had 
mistaken one side of a major mountain divide for the 
other, a significant error that convinced Shively that 
the Indians were lost. As Shively told Mills, the 
Indians had originally taken him along as a guide to 
9. "Journal of S. G. Fisher," Contributions tothe Historical Society of 
Montana, 10vols. (Boston:J. S. Canner, 1966), 2:269-282. Fisher's original 
journal, from which the Contributions article was taken, is in the Idaho 
Historical Society Archives, Boise. The original journal differs in several 
respects from the published version, which omits crucial details and 
introduces phrases and terms not present in the original. I am indebted to 
Cheryl Wilfong for first pointing out these discrepancies to me. 
lead them through the Absaroka Mountains-the 
east boundary of the Park. But once the Indians 
were east of the Yellowstone River and heading 
toward the Shoshone River and the route to Crow 
country, a "Snake chief' had claimed he knew the 
way and Shively was retired as guide. But instead of 
turning southeast and heading toward the Shoshone, 
the Nez Perces had ended up on the headwaters of 
the Lamar River (the East Fork of the Yellowstone). 
Shively claimed that he had known they were lost 
but had said nothing until after a "council of chiefs," 
when the Nez Perces asked him: "Which way to 
Crow country?" Shively had shown them "the open 
country about 20 miles off toward the Crow Coun- 
try," evidently from a high point of land near the Nez 
Perces' camp. He had escaped from his captors 
during that night, leaving the Indians to pursue the 
route he had shown them.8 
The only other detailed account we have of the 
Indians' movements in Yellowstone comes from the 
journal of S. G. Fisher, chief of Howard's scouts. 
Staying as close to the retreating Indians as they 
could, Fisher and some forty Bannock Indian scouts 
followed the Nez Perces east from the Yellowstone 
River to the headwaters of the Lamar, sending back 
reports to Howard. The only description of the 
Indians' route through the Absaroka Mountains is 
in Fisher's words.9 
Using Fisher's published journal, the reports of 
military commands, Shively's account, and informa- 
tion from a few Indian informants, historians have 
proposed several different routes that the Nez Perces 
might have taken through the mountains. All of the 
creeks that drain west from the Absarokas into the 
Lamar River-Soda Butte, Calfee, Cache, and 
Miller-have been identified as the Nez Perces' 
route, but the most recent histories have settled on 
either Cache Creek or Miller Creek as the most 
likely.10 A fresh examination of the sources and 
Yellowstone's topography, however, suggests that 
the main body of the Nez Perces followed the upper 
Lamar, that the Indians did not travel in one large 
group, and that they were never lost in the Park. 
10. E. S. Topping, Chronicles of the Yellowstone (St Paul: Pioneer 
Press, 1883), 219-220, describes the Nez Perce "going up Cache Creek" to 
cross the mountains. In 1895, in The Yellowstone National Park (1895; 
reprint, Norman: University of Oklamona Press, 1964), Hiram Martin 
Chittenden described the Nez Perce route as "the north-east boundary of 
the Park" (105); but in a subsequent edition (Cincinnati: Stewart & Kidd, 
1917), Chittenden wrote that the Nez Perce "left he Park by way of Miller 
Creek" (126). Merrill D. Beal, in 7 Will Fight No More Forever," 209, 
described the Nez Perce route as up Cache Creek. Brown, Flight of the Nez 
Perce, 338, believed that the Nez Perce "turned south-eastward up the 
divide between Cache and Calfee creeks." In The Nez Perce Indians, 
Josephy put the Nez Perce on Cache Creek, as did Aubrey Haines in The 
Yellowstone Story, 2 vols. (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 
1977), 1:236, and Richard A. Bartlett, Yellowstone: A Wilderness Beseiged 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1985), 27. In "Lost on Cold Creek," 
Montana, the Magazine of Western History 33 (Autumn 1973): 2-19, Daniel 
Goodenough did what other historians had failed to do: he scouted out the 
trail, with documents and maps in hand. He concluded that the Nez Perce 
went up Miller Creek. 
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he explanations for the Nez Perces' 
route and the time they spent in Yellowstone 
begin with the landscape. Traveling east of 
where the Yellowstone River emerges from the 
southern extremities of Yellowstone Lake, the Nez 
Perces ascended the meandering Pelican Creek 
through a lush valley of knee-deep grass, where 
their large herd of stock could feast. From this 
verdant haven, there were only a few routes that 
would take the Indians to buffalo country on the 
lower Yellowstone. There were not many passes 
through the Absarokas and few easy pathways 
through the dense lodgepole forest that carpeted 
the terrain below 8,000 feet in elevation. Heading to- 
ward the Absaroka range from Pelican Creek, the 
Indians had to make their trail over a low divide. 
Then they could either turn south and cross a 
higher divide to the Shoshone River drainage or 
continue east to the headwaters of the Lamar River 
at the base of the imposing Absarokas. The easiest 
path to the lower Yellowstone was down the 
Shoshone River; the next easiest routes, especially 
for such a large group, were either down the Lamar 
River and the lower canyons of the Yellowstone to 
broader valley terrain near present-day Livingston, 
Montana, or east up Soda Butte Creek and the upper 
section of the Clark's Fork of the Yellowstone, which 
cut through the eastern section of the Absarokas. 
The most difficult routes pierced the 11,000-foot- 
high Absaroka mountain chain-the narrow slots 
created by Miller, Cache, and Calfee creeks and the 
upper Lamar River. 
After capturing John Shively and the Montana 
tourists near the Firehole River on August 23-24, 
the Nez Perces moved east toward the Yellowstone 
River on a route that took them south of Mary 
Mountain. Along the trail, there was a commotion 
when several warriors threatened the tourists and 
shot George Cowan at point-blank range, leaving 
him for dead. During the fracas, five of the tourists 
escaped, taking their story and a description of the 
Nez Perces' location to Howard's troops at Henry's 
Lake. The three remaining tourists-Emma Cowan 
and Ida and Frank Carpenter-along with Shively 
and James C. Irwin, a recently discharged soldier 
the Indians had also captured, were pulled back into 
the Indians' procession. The Nez Perces trailed 
eastward along the southern fringe of the Hayden 
Valley to a ford across the Yellowstone River about 
four miles below Yellowstone Lake. They camped 
on the east bank of the river, discussed what to do 
with the captives, and decided to release Mrs. Cowan 
and the Carpenters on August 25. The Indians gave 
the women horses but put Frank Carpenter afoot, 
11. Cowan, "Reminiscences of Pioneer Life," Contributions, 4:172- 
176; Carpenter, Wonders of Geyser Land, 5862; Guie and McWhorter, Ad- 
ventures in Geyser Land, 201-231; McWhorter, Yellow Wolf, 170-176. 
thereby slowing the tourists' travel to the settle- 
ments. Taking Shively and Irwin along with them, 
the Indians continued east toward the Absarokas.11 
The next day, while S. G. Fisher and his scouts 
were inspecting the site where Cowan had been 
shot, the Indians moved their camp north to Yellow- 
stone Lake near present-day Indian Pond. On Au- 
gust 28, Fisher quickened his pursuit, following the 
Nez Perces' trail and crossing the Yellowstone, 
where they "passed one of the enemy's camps" and 
very nearly caught the Indians in camp by the lake. 
More interested in booty than conflict, Fisher's 
Bannock Indian scouts scattered when they saw two 
Nez Perce warriors. As Fisher jotted in his journal: 
"I told them [Bannocks] what I thought of their 
bravery." Switching to a fresh horse, Fisher pur- 
sued the Indians alone, going "up Pelican Creek 
about 10 miles, left it and went onto Mt., saw smoke 
from enemys camp." He got a good fix on the 
Indians' position and made his way down Pelican 
Creek, arriving in camp on the Yellowstone "about 
midnight."12 
Fisher spent the next two days in camp, arguing 
with his scouts and recovering from a stomach ail- 
ment. Howard's couts brought Fisher a new horse 
and word that George Cowan had been found alive. 
Emma Cowan and the Carpenters had also made 
their way safely to Mammoth, after being picked up 
west of Mt. Washburn on August 27 by soldiers 
from Fort Ellis who had been sent on a scouting 
party into the Park. After dismissing twenty-two of 
his Bannock scouts, Fisher selected afew Bannocks 
and some good frontiersmen in his camp, prepared 
his gear, and started off on the morning of August 
31 to track the Nez Perces through the dense lodge- 
pole forest below the Absarokas.13 
WV hile Fisher had been weeding his 
A/force, the Nez Perces had moved their 
v camps over the Pelican divide. By August 
31, they were on the headwaters of the Lamar River, 
at the base of the Absarokas. Probably the largest 
group to ever penetrate the Yellowstone wilderness, 
the Indians moved slowly, caravaning in several 
large bands. The group spread out over a mile wide 
when they crossed the Pelican Valley's lush mead- 
ows, then narrowed down to practically single-file 
columns when they ascended and descended the 
canyons. They left an unmistakable trail, one Fisher 
had little difficulty following. Howard's aide-de- 
12. Journal of S. G. Fisher, typescript, p. 5, Idaho State Historical 
Society Archives, Boise [Fisher Journal]. See also Fisher Journal, Contri- 
butions, 2:273. 
13. Fisher Journal, pp. 6-7; Fisher Journal, Contributions, 273-274; 
Mrs. George Cowan, "Reminiscences of Pioneer Life," 184-187. 
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camp, Charles E. S. Wood described the Nez 
Perce "horde": 
with their vast band of horses, [they] swept their 
path clean of subsistence, forage, and supplies, so 
that where they had abundance our ration was 
scanty... Where their animals grazed ours starved; 
where they had a horde of 2,000 fresh horses to 
replace their exhausted stock, we found only the 
useless ones they had abandoned.14 
How much Joseph, Looking Glass, and other Nez 
Perce leaders knew about the army's movements 
and how they responded to the information from 
their own scouts is not clear, but it is certain that the 
Indians knew of Howard's position, the location of 
ranches along the Yellowstone River, the existence 
of tourist parties in the Park, and the advance of 
additional troops from Fort Ellis. Once over the 
Pelican Creek divide on August 28-with Fisher 
trailing them-the Nez Perces sent scouts to find 
the best route through the mountains. It is likely 
that one of these scouting parties brought back 
information that turned the Indians away from 
crossing over to the Shoshone River. According 
to Hugh L. Scott, a young officer who accompanied 
Lieutenant Gustavus Doane's command from Fort 
Ellis, Chief Joseph told him repeatedly in later years 
that the Nez Perces had intended to go down the 
Yellowstone, "leaving the mountains where the river 
turns northeast-now the site of the town of Living- 
ston." The Indians decided against the route, Jo- 
seph told Scott, when Nez Perce scouts encoun- 
tered Doane's small force coming up the Yellow- 
stone on August 31.15 
This explanation raises questions. If the Nez 
Perces intended to descend the Yellowstone, why 
did they cross the river in the first place? Why not go 
down the river on the west bank? When the Indians 
entered the Park, they came up the Madison River 
to the Firehole, not north to Indian Creek on the 
Bannock Trail, a traditional Indian route across the 
Yellowstone Plateau. When they enlisted Shively as 
a guide on August 24, the Nez Perces wanted to take 
the most direct route to Crow country-east through 
Yellowstone and down the Shoshone. Once they 
had crossed the Yellowstone on August 25, the Nez 
Perces sent representatives to enlist the aid of the 
Crows, but they returned with bad news: the Crows 
14. Charles E. S. Wood, General Field Orders No. 6, Report of the 
Secretary of War, 45th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Ex. Doc. 1 (Serial 1794), 619. 
15. Hugh Lenox Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New York: The 
Century Company, 1928), 64-65. Scott wrote: "I was first told of this by 
Joseph in 1877, and his information was confirmed by a signed statement 
obtained by the Nez Perce agent at Nespelem, Washington." 
16. Lean Elk, the mixed-blood who had responsibility for Shively and 
Irwin, told them after they had crossed the Yellowstone that scouts had 
been sent to get aid from the Crows. Shively's account, New Northwest, 
September 14,1877; Scott, Memories of a Soldier, 65; Thomas B. Marquis, 
Memoirs of a White Crow Indian (New York: Century Company, 1928), 
128-130. 
wanted no part of the Nez Perces' trouble. The Nez 
Perces then set their route down the Lamar and 
Yellowstone rivers, as Joseph told Scott, because 
"they did not wish to encounter any more troops on 
their front, with the risk of being caught between 
two forces." Ironically, if the Indians had gone down 
the Yellowstone they would have run headlong into 
Colonel S. D. Sturgis's 360-man force, which was 
then at Crow Agency on the Stillwater River ready to 
catch the Nez Perces in a pincer.16 
In Shively's account, after the Indians had re- 
moved him as guide, they had "merely gone around 
a mountain and came down on the same tributary 
waters instead of crossing the divide [to the 
Shoshone River]." As Shively saw it, the Indians had 
become confused by the landscape and had gotten 
"lost."7 To questions put to them many years later 
by historian Lucullus McWhorter, Nez Perce veter- 
ans of the trek through Yellowstone had other an- 
swers. 
McWhorter: Was Joseph lost in Yellowstone Na- 
tional Park? 
Nez Perce: Chief Joseph never lost there, maybe 
another man lost there. 
McWhorter: Was Joseph lost in Yellowstone Na- 
tional Park? 
Nez Perce: I am (surely) no way to get lost, because 
Paul Jackson father was leading the entire pro- 
cession at that day. He name was Ho-to-toe-e, it 
means something like mix with tobacco ... he 
was familiar with the country east of the Rocky 
Mountains ... he always live there, raised there, 
and the Indians depend on him at that day.18 
The Indians were not lost in Yellowstone, but 
they were in a quandary about which route would be 
the safest. Their only information came from the 
several scouting-raiding parties they had sent out as 
they moved east across the Park. On August 26, one 
of these parties charged a group of tourists from 
Helena in their camp at Otter Creek, not far from the 
falls of the Yellowstone. The raiders fired on the 
campers, chased them on horseback, looted their 
camp, and left one tourist dead before they returned 
to the Nez Perces' main camp at Indian Pond. Three 
days later, another raiding party descended the 
Yellowstone below present-day Gardiner and looted 
and burned the ranch of the Henderson brothers. 
Scott's men chased the Indians back up the river, 
17. New Northwest, September 14, 1877. There is some question 
whether Shively was actually the Indians' principal guide. Responding to 
queries by Lucullus McWhorter, J. W. Reddington suggested that Irwin 
guided the Indians and that Shively was actually "boss of the packtrain." 
J. W. Reddington to Lucullus McWhorter, January 20, March 10, 1931, 
Folder 175, #13, and Folder 158, #93, Lucullus McWhorter Papers, Wash- 
ington State University Archives, Pullman [McWhorter Papers]. Yellow 
Wolf also told McWhorter that Shively guided the Indians for only part of 
one day, when they were west of the Yellowstone River. McWhorter, 
Yellow Wolf, 170. 
18. Lucullus McWhorter'sinterrogations, Folder 158, Misc. notes#14 
and #15, McWhorter Papers. 
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where they fired on three couriers who had been 
sent by Colonel Sturgis. It is likely that this is the 
raiding party that alerted Joseph that the military 
blocked the Indians' route down the Yellowstone.19 
Another group of scouts included Yellow Wolf, 
who later told McWhorter: "It was a few suns after 
the chiefs turned the white man and women [Emma 
Cowan and the Carpenters] loose that what I am 
telling you happened." At McCartney's Hotel in 
Mammoth, Yellow Wolf s raiders surprised Richard 
Dietrich, one of the Helena campers, and shot him 
down. The Indian who pulled the trigger shouted: 
"We are going to kill him now. I am a man! I am 
going to shoot him!" After the killing, Yellow Wolf 
and his friends skirmished with other whites, 
rounded up some horses, and headed back to the 
Nez Perces' camp on the Lamar River.20 
n some accounts, the raiders who burned 
the Henderson ranch are linked to the Dietrich 
killing and also to the burning of Baronett's 
bridge on the Yellowstone. Historians have assumed 
that all of these raiding parties came from the same 
camp, were under the control of one or two chiefs, 
and had first crossed Baronett's bridge from the 
east before burning it when they re-crossed it from 
the west. In Yellow Wolf's case, his scouting was 
due as much to his own sense of purpose as to direc- 
tives from warrior chiefs. As he told McWhorter, 
there were several scouting parties and "each party 
did scouting every sun." Whether the raiders used 
Baronett's bridge is also questionable. Under re- 
peated questioning by historian McWhorter, Yel- 
low Wolf insisted that he knew of no bridge across 
the Yellowstone.21 
McWhorter: Whatway did warriors go to the bridge 
that was partly burned? 
Yellow Wolf: There was no bridge that I know of but 
some of the Indians burned up some beding and 
grube. 
McWhorter: West or east side of Yellowstone River? 
Yellow Wolf: We went over into Yellowstone River.22 
If Yellow Wolf did not use Baronett's bridge and 
had not heard of it, then how did he get from 
Mammoth Hot Springs to the Lamar River? And 
does his route tell us anything about the Indians' 
strategy? Yellow Wolfs answer to McWhorter's 
question gives us a clue: He said he went into the 
river. The traditional crossing point on the Yellow- 
19. Brown, Flight of the Nez Perce, 329-334; Col. John Gibbon to 
Assistant Adj. Gen. Dept of Dakota, October 18, 1877, in Report of the 
Secretary of War, 1877, 522; Scott, Memories of a Soldier, 61-63; Shively's 
account, New Northwest, September 14, 1877; Mary Allen Phinney,Jirah 
Isham Allen (Rutland, Vermont: Tuttle Publishing Company, n.d.), 96; 
Orrin H. and Lorraine Bonney, Battle Drums and Geysers (Chicago: 
Swallow Press, 1970), 77-80. 
20. McWhorter, Yellow Wolf, 172,177. 
stone, where the Bannock Trail intersects the river, 
is near present-day Tower Fall.23 Many of the Nez 
Perces knew the Bannock route, and if any of them 
had been with the young Yellow Wolf that day it is 
likely that they would have forded the river and 
followed the trail across Specimen Ridge and down 
to the Lamar. 
When Yellow Wolfs group-and likely the group 
that had burned Henderson's ranch-returned to 
camp, they told Joseph that more whites and the 
army were thick down the Yellowstone. This infor- 
mation must have put Joseph, Looking Glass, and 
other chiefs in a quandary. They had rejected going 
to the Shoshone River, their prime route down the 
Yellowstone was blocked, and they wanted to avoid 
the white settlement at the Clark's Fork mines, 
which lay to the northeast up Soda Butte Creek. 
Shively described the scene: "Here scouts were sent 
out, the Snake chief going to Baronette's bridge, 
which he burned. Then they knew they were lost."24 
Knowing that soldiers were on their trail and mov- 
ing at them from at least two directions, Joseph and 
the other chiefs had only one option: travel directly 
through the Absarokas, up one of the streams run- 
ning west from the divide. Butwhich one was safest? 
There are few clues about exactly where the 
Nez Perces were on the Lamar River when they 
realized their predicament. Shively told Mills that 
the Indians were about fifteen miles southeast of 
the Clark's Fork mines, but that cannot be correct; 
the easternmost extremities of the Lamar drainage 
are south and west of the mines. Shively's estimates 
of distance were also inaccurate. Fisher, Irwin, and 
J. W. Reddington, an experienced scout who 
tracked the Indians with Fisher for several days, 
were trained observers who drew maps of the area, 
fixed locations, and accurately estimated mileage. 
Their accounts provide the most reliable informa- 
tion about the location of the Nez Perces' camp on 
the Lamar River. 
Fisher began his pursuit of the Indians on Sep- 
tember 1 from his camp below Yellowstone Lake. 
Following the Nez Perces' trail up Pelican Creek, 
Fisher reported in his journal, he "met a white man 
suddenly. I instantly covered him with my gun and 
ordered him to advance ... believeing at the time 
that he belonged to the Enemy.... he evaded an 
answer asking who I was." The two men swapped 
21. McWhorter, Yellow Wolf, 175-177. General Howard, in "Supple- 
mentary Report. Non-Treaty Nez Perce Campaign" (December 26,1877), 
Report of the Secretary of War, 1877,621, reported that his scouts brought 
him information that one group of raiders, "probably not more than ten in 
number," had burned a store, killed a citizen, fought with Doane's troops, 
and then recrossed the Yellowstone and burned Baronett's bridge. To 
questions about the couriers fired on by raiders near Tower Fall, Yellow 
Wolf responded: "I don't know any thing about this question ... I never 
heard of it." Brown, Flight of the Nez Perce, 331-333, repeated the stories of 
separate raiding parties without distinguishing between the groups. 
22. McWhorter interrogations, Folder 158, #124, McWhorter 
Papers. 
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Baronett's bridge, which the Nez Perces burned during their flight in 1871, was built by Jack Baronett 
who would become one of the first assistant superintendents of Yellowstone National Park. The toll 
bridge was built to provide access to newly discovered mines at the Clark's Fork of the Yellowstone. 
questions warily for a few minutes before Fisher 
accepted his claim that "he was an escaped prisoner 
from Josephs band." It was Irwin, the soldier who 
had been captured by the Indians a week earlier on 
the Firehole River. He had escaped with Shively's 
help and had backtracked on the Indians' trail. 
Fisher pumped Irwin for information and then sent 
him back to Howard's headquarters before continu- 
ing into the wilderness on the Indians' track.25 
"We made about six miles... we are now on the 
water of East Fork ofYellowstone... liveing on meat 
streight," Fisher wrote on September 2, two days 
after Joseph and Looking Glass had discussed their 
options in a council meeting. The next day Fisher 
pressed on into the dense lodgepole pine forest, 
where the Nez Perces had taken an incredible trail, 
pushing their livestock hard and funneling down 
23. Aubrey L Haines, "The Bannock Indian Trails of Yellowstone 
National Park," Archaeology in Montana 4 (March 1962): 1-8; Haines, 
Yellowstone Story, 2:27-28; Brigham D. Madsen, The Bannock of Idaho 
(Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Press, 1958), 20, 23,180. 
24. New Northwest, September 14, 1877. In his report on the events 
in Yellowstone, Colonel Gibbon wrote that the Nez Perces traveled down 
the east bank of the Yellowstone "as far as Baronette's bridge, which they 
burnt,.. ." Report of the Secretary of War, 1877, 522. 
25. Fisher Journal, p. 7; Fisher Journal, Contributions, 274; New 
Northwest, September 14, 1877; Idaho Statesman, September 20, 1877. 
the few open passages in the timber. Fisher could 
not believe the trail and the Indians' determination: 
September, Monday 3, 1877. Off on trail at 
daylight passed down the roughist canyon I was 
ever through dead and fallen timbr and rocks found 
plenty of dead crippled horses left by the enemy 
they evidently had a hard struggle to get through 
this place for the trees and logs was smeared with 
blood from their horses cut on the sharp stones & 
pine knots.... 
At this point, Fisher and his few remaining scouts 
came up quickly upon the Nez Perces' camp. 'We 
saw the Enemy's camp about 7 or 8 miles to the East 
of us on or near the Sumit of a high Mt," Fisher wrote 
on September 3, just as J. W. Reddington "brought 
us some Bacon & beans and letter from Command." 
Reddington found Fisher camped in a meadow on 
lower Mist Creek, not far from the Lamar River.26 
26. Fisher Journal, p. 8. The published version of Fisher's Journal in 
Contributions does not include these passages, which pinpoint Fisher's 
location in the lower meadows of Mist Creek. Working from the published 
version, Daniel Goodenough assumed that Fisher was on Cold Creek, but 
in his unedited journal Fisher wrote: "We were several hours makeing 
down to the Main creek, one of the branches of East Fork." This must be 
Mist Creek, not Cold Creek, which Fisher would not have described as 
"the Main creek." 
25 
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The mouth of the upper Lamar River is wide and inviting, with plenty of room on each side of the 
river to drive horses. Farther up the river, the canyon narrows but the river bottom remains wide 
and relatively clear of timber. 
isher and Reddington climbed to the top 
of a ridge at dawn. As Reddington remem- 
bered it, "we looked right across a deep canyon 
and into hostile camp, and it struck us that they were 
putting up log breastworks to make a stand and 
give battle." The two men saw activity in the Nez 
Perces' camp, but it is more likely that the Indians 
were preparing to leave rather than digging in for a 
fight. The night before, Shively had escaped after 
he had showed the Indians a route to Crow country. 
It is clear that the Nez Perces were worried about 
how much the military knew about their location. 
Lean Elk had warned Shively after Irwin's escape: 
"I no care [about Irwin] but if you try to go I get 
heap mad." The Indians knew that they had to move 
27. J. W. Reddington to Lucullus V. McWhorter, November 1931, 
Folder 175, #167, McWhorter Papers; J. W. Reddington, "Scouting in 
Montana in the 1870s," typescript, John W. Reddington Papers, SC 683, 
MHSA; Shively's Account, New Northwest, September 14, 1877. Redding- 
ton wrote several articles about his years as a scout for Sunset Magazine, 
Pacific Monthly, and other publications. He was consistent in his telling of 
the Nez Perce story. See manuscript articles in John W. Reddington 
Papers, University of Washington Archives, Seattle. 
28. Fisher Journal, p. 8; Fisher Journal, Contributions, 275. 
quickly if they expected to elude the military. 
Their respite in Yellowstone National Park was 
about over.27 
Fisher sketched a map of the Indians' camp and 
wrote to Howard, advising him to strike out for the 
Clark's Fork "by some other route" to intercept the 
Nez Perces, because he thought it "next to impos- 
sible for him [Howard] to move his Command over 
this trail." Sending Reddington back to Howard's 
command, Fisher left camp early on September 4 to 
keep watch on the Indians. After working his way 
through the thick timber, Fisher 
saw them gather their horses and pull down lodges 
about noon .... They are following up Canyon 
29. This description is based on personal observations in the Lamar 
River area in 1983. The Yellowstone forest goes through a full cycle 
approximately every 100 years, so what we see in the mid-1980s is probably 
the kind of conditions the Nez Perces saw. Daniel Goodenough, in his 
1973 article, assumed that the "trap" was Miller Creek, even though, as he 
noted, "Miller Creek is not, in fact a complete 'trap'." He calls it a "trap," 
because "a party moving on horses would have no sensible route through 
the mountains except to follow the stream up and over Bootjack Gap." This 
is faulty reasoning, assuming beforehand that BootJack Gap was their 
destination, an area that provided no reasonable camping area or place for 
2,000 head of livestock. Goodenough, "Lost on Cold Creek," 26. 
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nearly East. They are now in what the Bannocks call 
the trap; they tell me that there is no way of 
getting out of it except at each end being about 15 
miles through it. After dogging them along about 3 
miles at 2 p.m. we heard rapid fireing imediately 
below us in the Canyon about 100 shots fired. We 
left our horses and started down towards the fire- 
ing but find a perpendicular wall between us and 
the row... 28 
Fisher's description of the Nez Perces' escape 
route- presumably the one that Shively had showed 
them-is the most important clue to the Indians' 
track through the Absarokas. On a topographical 
map of Yellowstone National Park, Miller Creek 
and the upper Lamar River look like good candi- 
dates for the Bannock's "trap"; both are long, deep 
canyons, with few or no exits. But when you look at 
the canyons on the ground, they are very different. 
Miller Creek is a steep and thickly forested canyon, 
matted with a tangle of fallen lodgepole pines, 
sometimes three logs deep. The upper Lamar is a 
deep slash in the volcanic mountainside, with pre- 
cipitous cliffs and only two exits near the end of its 
canyon. Because of frequent run-off floods, the river 
has cut a wide swath as it drops to the canyon floor. 
Paved with river rock and free of timber, the upper 
Lamar opens like an inviting causeway and then 
quickly turns into a narrowing funnel as it climbs 
toward the Absaroka summit. This was the Nez 
Perces' shortest and most direct route to the Clark's 
Fork. Given the choice, it seems very unlikely that 
the Nez Perces would have passed by this "trap" for 
the logjam jumble of Miller Creek.29 
There is other evidence that the upper Lamar is 
the "trap" and the principal route the Nez Perces 
took through the Absarokas. When recounting his 
scouting with Fisher, Reddington remembered 
searching for Shively: 
No, we did not see Shively, butwe saw his big tracks 
in the mud along the creek where he escaped. They 
looked as though he was wearing a no. 13 boot. We 
followed his trail some distance, and yelled fre- 
quently so that if he was hiding in the brush he 
would come out; but we got no response.30 
Reddington had been with Fisher only a few hours, 
when they were "on the headwaters of the East Fork 
of the Yellowstone." The only streams he could have 
inspected were the upper Lamar, Mist Creek, and 
Cold Creek.31 
30. Reddington to McWhorter, March 10, 1931, Folder 158, #93, 
McWhorter Papers. 
31. Reddington to McWhorter, November 1931, Folder 175, #167. 
When he was asked whether the Indians went up Miller Creek, Redding- 
ton replied: "I never heard of Miller Krick [Miller Creek was named in 
1880], and know that the hostile's main trail led up Pelican Krick, and on 
the northwest owards the head of East Fork." Reddington to McWhorter, 
February 1935, Folder 175, #99. Reddington corrected McWhorter's map, 
which had the Nez Perces traveling directly across the Mirror Plateau, 
Folder 175, #100, McWhorter Papers. 
Reddington left for Howard's command on the 
morning of September 3, before Fisher saw the Nez 
perces pack up their camp and before he continued 
down the Lamar River toward Soda Butte Creek. 
When Shively went to Lean Elk's lodge on the night 
of September 2-"with his boots on" as he put it- 
and then escaped under a clear and dark sky, he 
"started south... then circled around north... and 
headed for Baronette's bridge on the Yellowstone, 
forty miles away." Shively guided himself by the 
"Soda Buttes and the North Star," which he could 
see from the ridge. It is likely that Shively left the 
Nez Perces' camp near present-day Little Saddle 
Mountain, crossed the Lamar River near its junction 
with the upper Lamar (where Reddington would 
have seen his bootprint), and traveled on the ridge 
west of the river to Baronett's bridge.32 
After he watched the Indians flee into the "trap," 
Fisher returned to camp and waited for his scouts to 
return with information about the location of the 
fleeing Indians. The scouts had exchanged fire with 
the rearguard of the fleeing Indians-the shots that 
Fisher had heard echoing in the canyon below him. 
As Fisher recorded in his journal, his scouts told 
him that the Nez Perces had tried to negotiate, 
hollering to them: 
we dont want to fight you for if you are Crows 
Bannocks or Snakes you are our friends let us talk 
and Smoke. but the boys knew their game too well 
and told them they would talk with their guns the 
boys stood them off untill after dark left their extra 
animals and slid out cautiously.33 
This report left no doubt in Fisher's mind that the 
Nez Perces were moving east to the Clark's Fork. 
He spent September 5 in camp cleaning guns, writ- 
ing reports for the command, and reflecting on his 
situation. "Am tired," Fisher wrote in his journal, "of 
trying to get Soldiers & hostiles together. U.S. too 
slow for business." 
On September 6, Fisher led his scouts down the 
Lamar about fifteen miles to Soda Butte Creek, 
where they followed the now fast-moving com- 
mand to the Clark's Fork. But on the way down 
the Lamar, the scouts again found "the enemys trail" 
at "a point where it [Lamar] formed a junction with 
another Stream betwixt the Stream we followed 
down and Soda Butte Creek. They [Nez Perces] 
then turned South of East following up this middle 
stream."34 
32. New Northwest, September 14, 1877. Little Saddle Mountain is 
high enough to provide a clear view over the Absaroka divide to the 
Clark's Fork of the Yellowstone, so it could be the peak from which 
"Shively showed them [Indians] the open country about 20 miles off 
toward Crow country." 
33. Fisher Journal, p. 9. 
34. Ibid. Using Fisher's mileage estimates, it is clear that he was near 
the mouth of the upper Lamar River when he watched the Indians head 
east into the "trap." 
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This description in Fisher's journal is 
confusing. How could he watch the Indians 
dive into the "trap" and then discover their 
trail again twelve miles down the Lamar?35 The 
answer to the riddle begins with the assumption 
that the Nez Perces traveled in one large group and 
that Joseph and Looking Glass camped together. 
There is no reason for this assumption and much 
evidence to the contrary. Yellow Wolf tells us that 
several scouting parties canvased both sides of the 
Yellowstone River and that they operated from dif- 
ferent camps. And McWhorter's informants told 
him that Joseph was not lost but perhaps another 
group had become disoriented.36 
We know that Shively was with Lean Elk and 
Looking Glass and that the "Snake Chief' who had 
been sent to scout for soldiers had been the one to 
burn Baronett's bridge. What we do not know is 
whether the "Snake Chief' was with Looking Glass 
or Joseph. It is likely that Joseph, who had later 
insisted to Hugh Scott that he had wanted to travel 
down the Yellowstone, had moved down the Lamar 
to near Miller or Calfee creeks. This would have put 
the two main Nez Perce camps about eight to ten 
miles apart, with the livestock near the upper Lamar, 
the only place along the Lamar River with sufficient 
pasture for such a large herd. We also know from a 
newspaper corrrespondent that Howard's military 
scouts, who ascended the Lamar from Soda Butte 
Creek after Fisher had caught up with Howard's 
command, followed the Indians' trail to 
a washed-out basin, where the constant action of 
the elements has left pinnacles, towers and battle- 
ments of titanic structure [where].... we could in 
half a daybag the lot [Nez Perces] if we were strong 
enough. They now number nearly 200 lodges.37 
The correspondent was describing the Hoodoo 
Basin at the head of the upper Lamar, a place of 
exotic-looking rock formations and the logical exit 
from the "trap." The Hoodoo Basin is also easily 
reached by ascending the Bannock Trail between 
Cache and Calfee creeks and traversing south along 
theAbsaroka divide. SoJoseph's and Looking Glass's 
bands could easily have rendezvoused in the area 
extending from Parker Peak to the Hoodoo Basin. 
There are also large parks in the area, which could 
have provided the livestock with ample grazing. 
From the Hoodoo Basin area, the Nez Perces had 
several easy routes they could have taken to Cran- 
dall Creek and the Clark's Fork River, where Fisher, 
35. In Flight of the Nez Perce (338-339), Brown noted Fisher's discov- 
ery of the "enemys trail" but did not find the contradiction, conjecturing 
that "it is highly probable that the Indians continued to follow the old 
Bannock Trail," which went over the divide at Canoe Lake. Aubrey 
Haines, The Yellowstone Story, 1:235-236, also mentioned Fisher's double 
discovery, but he put the Indians in both instances on the Bannock Trail, 
even though Fisher had traveled twelve miles between sightings. 
prospector George Huston, and two of Howard's 
officers found the Nez Perces' trail on September 8. 
From Crandall Creek, the Indians went up Dead 
Indian Hill, drew Colonel Samuel Sturgis out of 
position, and dropped down to the mouth of the 
Clark's Fork Canyon and out toward the Yellow- 
stone River. That deception and the subsequent 
fight at Canyon Creek against Sturgis's troops is 
another chapter in the story of the flight. From the 
Nez Perces' exit from Yellowstone National Park in 
September to the horrific battle at Snake Creek in 
the Bears Paw Mountains one month later, the 
sequence of forced marches, skirmishes, and battle 
rushed the Indians headlong into a tragic history. 
What remains important in this story is the Nez 
Perces' respite in the Park. 
There is no proof that the upper Lamar was the 
primary course taken by the Nez Perces, even though 
the preponderance of evidence, both in the docu- 
mentary record and on the landscape, strongly 
suggests this route. It is an interesting finding, but 
if that were all that we could learn from the evidence 
this would be an only an engaging exercise. There 
is something of more substance here. 
What the evidence indicates is that the Nez Pe- 
rces were not lost in Yellowstone National Park. 
Several of the leaders, including Looking Glass and 
Lean Elk, had been on the Yellowstone River many 
times before and knew the region. While they made 
their way through the Park-especially after they 
had captured the tourists-the Indians kept scouts 
busy searching for the best routes and on the 
lookout for the military and more tourists. More im- 
portantly, the Nez Perces remained set on avoiding 
conflict, even though they could not always control 
young warriors who wanted to count coup or were 
bent on revenge for the Big Hole battle. They set the 
Carpenters free and did not pursue members of the 
Cowan party who had fled or Irwin after he had 
escaped. During their trek through the Park, they 
maintained no rear guard until Fisher's scouts pur- 
sued them as they fled into the "trap." 
The evidence also indicates that the Nez Perces 
made their strategic and tactical decisions in a council 
of leaders after discussing the alternatives. They 
made these decisions as they went, facing each 
situation and evaluating the inherent dangers. They 
made some serious mistakes, both before and after 
36. McWhorter, Yellow Wolf, 177; McWhorter interrogations, Folder 
158, #124. 
37. Frank J. Parker in Idaho Weekly Statesman, September 29, 1877. 
Parker reported on the army's progress after they crossed the partially 
burned bridge. The dateline for this segment was September 9,1877, in the 
Yellowstone wilderness. 
38. New Northwest, September 14, 1877. Over the years, I have 
profited immensely from discussions with Stu Conner of Billings, Mon- 
tana, about the terrain near the Clark's Fork and the Nez Perces' route 
down to Canyon Creek. 
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At the top of the Absaroka divide, where the two main Nez Perce groups may have joined up, there are 
several open park areas where the Indians' large herd could have grazed. 
they were in Yellowstone, but there is little question 
that they succeeded in eluding the military and 
thoroughly frustrating their pursuers. While they 
were in the Park, they operated with limited knowl- 
edge of the military's positions and strategy and 
they made mistakes, but their errors were not due to 
ignorance about their location, confusion about the 
landscape, or fickleness in their goal. The Nez Perces 
wanted to stay in the Park. In other words, they 
decided to remain in the Park; they were not there 
because of disorientation or incompetence. 
ut this still does not answer the larger 
questions: why did the Nez Perces want to 
stay in the Park, and why did they stay so 
long? The few clues suggest some educated specu- 
lations. For one thing, the Nez Perces were tired 
and needed to rest. They had been under steady 
military pressure ever since they had entered 
Montana, and Yellowstone offered them a measure 
of relative safety. They also expected aid and sanc- 
tuary from the Crows, whose territory lay just be- 
yond the mountains on the east edge of the Park. 
For another, the Nez Perces were hungry. They had 
kept moving after the Big Hole battle and had done 
little hunting. In Yellowstone it was different, as 
Lean Elk had told Shively: the Indians planned to 
stay in the Park for a few days, because the "elk were 
abundant and they were living off the fat of the 
land."38 Finally, they may have remained because 
the terrain and grasses looked disarmingly like 
their homeland in Idaho and Oregon. 
Regardless of why they remained in the Park for 
thirteen days, it probably was the crucial difference 
between a late summer escape to Canada and the 
cold and snowy Snake Creek seige that brought 
their surrender in early October. Throughout their 
ordeal, the Nez Perces had pursued the same strat- 
egy: avoidance of conflict with whites and attain- 
ment of sanctuary. What they wanted was their true 
and just homeland and an end to harassment. Those 
days in the Park may have been the closest they 
came to their goals during their heroic flight. o^_ 
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